What would be the military purpose of the mission? That is a closely held secret: suggesting the objective might give away the beachhead. It’s safe to assume that the nearly 40 amphibious-warfare vessels assembled in the gulf-the largest amphibious landing force since the invasion of Inchon in Korea in 1950-are part of an effort to support the Army’s tank assault north against Iraqi defenses in Kuwait. One possible goal is to land troops behind Iraq’s first line of defense in southern Kuwait. Perhaps the aim is to retake Kuwait City. Saddam Hussein seems to have considered both possibilities: the Persian Gulf’s counterclockwise tides have carried Iraq’s 7 million-barrel oil spill directly across landing routes for either of the above strategies.
More likely, though, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, the U.S. commander has a different scenario in mind. Amphibious assault–so critical to the Normandy invasion and island hopping in the Pacific campaign during World War II–relies on speed and surprise, and will probably take place at night. The hallmarks of an amphibious landing are a seaborne assault launched over the horizon from fast craft that can race to the beach from a distance of up to 25 miles; a helicopter-borne assault behind enemy beach defenses, a tactic known as vertical envelopment; a double-wave doctrine–the first to capture a beachhead, the second to reinforce it, and the 90-minute window, the maximum amount of time for the Marines to assemble enough combat power onshore to meet a counterattack by the enemy. Here, in more graphic terms, is what Saddam can look forward to:
First, a massive bombardment of his coastal defenses. Launched from aircraft carriers and covered by F-14 fighters, A-6s and F/A-18s will pound Silkworm missile-launching sites–Iraq’s best hope of damaging major American warships. They will also hit heavy artillery near the coast. Land-based bombers, perhaps even B-52s, will also get into the act to cripple Iraq’s ability to respond quickly to a Marine landing. If particular radars or communications centers must be destroyed, F-117A Stealth fighters will be on hand.
Next will come a punishing round of salvos from U.S. battleships in the Persian Gulf. Aside from their arsenal of Tomahawk cruise missiles, the USS Missouri and the Wisconsin carry 16-inch guns, with a range of about 23 miles. These will pound the area around the beachhead, attempting to create a safe perimeter around the Marines’ position. At the same time, carrier-based strike aircraft–flying under the whistling arc of battleship shells–will carry out low-level sorties parallel to the beach to provide pinpoint fire against Iraqis. Meanwhile, the Navy’s E-2C Hawkeye early-warning aircraft will be scanning the skies for approaching Iraqi planes, particularly the Exocet-armed Mirage F-ls now moved to Iran.
Then, finally, come the Marines. The first wave of assault craft will be a fleet of up to 21 unarmed hovercraft, which can zip toward the swore at 50 knots and carry up to three basic amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs) or three light armored vehicles (LAVs). Each AAV can transport 25 Marines and their equipment, landing safely even in 10-foot surf. But at five to seven knots, they are slow; hovercraft will drop them into the water no more than a mile from the beach.
As the first seaborne assault wave approaches, the first wave of airborne Marines will be clattering overhead. Ferried in its own helicopter fleet–the CH-46E Sea Knight and the CH-53 Sea Stallions and Super Stallions–a battalion-size Marine force will land in minutes to seize an outer perimeter of the beachhead, an area some five miles inland from the assault beach itself. Flying shotgun for the Stallions will be the Marines’ AH-1W SeaCobra attack helicopters with enough firepower–20-mm cannon in nose turrets, as well as Hellfire and TOW antitank missiles and Sidewinder antiaircraft missiles–to act as both gunships and mobile defense against Iraqi infantry ground fire.
The first wave of ground forces won’t be heavily armed. But, with the help of close air support from Cobras and Harrier AV-8Bs, it won’t be defenseless, either. The Marines will carry a small arsenal of portable firepower, including: 81-mm mortars to hit long-range targets, shoulder-fired Dragon missiles and light anti-armor weapons for shorter ones; 40-mm grenade launchers attached to the standard M-16A2 rifles to pummel Iraqi infantry, and shoulder-fired, multipurpose assault weapons that can take out bunkers.
Knockout punch: Last comes the second wave of LCAC (landing craft, air cushion) hovercraft, as well as other landing craft, bringing in additional troops and the Marines’ M-1A1 tanks and heralding the second wave of helicopters, ferrying 105-mm and 198-mm howitzers. Continued allied air superiority will prevent a major counterattack by an organized force of Iraqi tanks and allow around-the-clock buildup of heavier weapons by Marines–up to 150 or so tanks–to attack the enemy from the flank or from the rear.
No one believes such a campaign can proceed flawlessly and without high casualties. Allied planners expect desperate Iraqis to put up a prodigious fight. Another oil slick would slow up amphibious armored personnel carriers. Marine intelligence officers believe the Iraqis have hauled electric-power lines to some parts of the Kuwaiti coast. The idea, however improbable, is to throw the power lines into the surf and electrocute incoming Marines. At the very least, coastal waters will be lined with mines to blow up amphibious craft; beaches will conceal thousands of tank traps, barriers and minefields. Among the deadliest obstacles: oil drums filled with gelatinized gasoline, buried in the sand beneath barbed wire, which, when detonated, explode like napalm.
Still, the Marines badly want this engagement. Successful amphibious campaigns capture the imagination. “We need a victory,” concedes a senior Marine officer. “Beirut was a disaster. In Panama, we were overshadowed by the Army. We need a chance to show a new generation of the American people what the Marines can do.” Marines fare well in war–images of planting the flag at the summit of Iwo Jima and even stoically retreating from the Chosin reservoir to the coast in North Korea are virtual American icons–and shabbily in the peacetime fight for mission and money. In post-cold-war days, the corps is locked in acrimonious debate with the Army over which should serve as the primary U.S. expeditionary force. The outcome will depend to some extent on how each branch of the service conducts itself in the gulf.
Winning renown comes at an awful price. Amphibious assault is still the most perilous form of warfare, even though it has come a long way from its origins–the grim and bloody engagements in the Pacific and, later, in Korea. But in a society that regards history as largely irrelevant, the U.S. military stands out as a conspicuous exception. No Marine will ever forget the disastrous lesson of Tarawa, a landing in the Gilbert Islands in November 1943. There, an amphibious landing was assigned to take a beach fenced in by an offshore coral reef Thanks to poor intelligence about the local tides, their landing craft ran aground on the reef. The Marines had to disembark and wade 700 yards to shore in chest-high water, as Japanese gunners cut them mercilessly to pieces. The result: 1,113 dead, 2,290 wounded in 76 hours. That battle taught the corps some lessons about preparation and air support that served it for the rest of the war. And will serve it again in the Persian Gulf.
Navy SEALs have been making secret reconnaissance missions, probing the beaches for suitable landing sites for the heavy equipment to come and scouting such hazards as minefields and submerged high-voltage wires.
Big guns from ships 25 miles out-beyond the radar horizon-fire artillery to soften up Iraqi defenses. F/A-18s and A-6E Intruders police the skies on- and offshore and take out Iraqi defenses, while AV-8B Harriers provide close-in support for ground troops.
Troops come in by CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters and amphibious landing vehicles; each group is followed (ideally, within 90 minutes, the expected enemy response time) by its artillery and equipment.
